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ADMIRALTY.
Gnlision-Duty of Steamcr.-Though a steamship pursuing, in a
crou ded harbor, for her own greater convenience in getting into dock
in a particular state of the harbor, a channel not entirely the ordinar3
one for vessels of her size, be bound to more than ordinary precaution,
yet if she has a right to use that channel and do take such more than
ordinary precaution, she is not responsible for accidents to other vessels
that, with it all, were inevitable : The Jaca, 14 Wall.
Hence, where such a steamship pursuing in such a case such a chan-
nel, with the utmost care, had occasion to cross at an acute angle the
stern of a large school-ship that stood high out of water (so obstructing
view), and thus struck and injured a small schooner that drifting along
on the other side of the school-ship, emerged suddenly at its stern-the
steamship not having before seen the schooner, nor the schooner the
steamship-held that the steamship was not responsible; the more espe-
cially as the schooner which was going out of port had just cast away
her tug, was drifting along with the tide, and having all her hands
engaged in hoisting sail, had no sails set so as to make her specially
visible, nor any lookout to see ahead: Id.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
Proof in Mlitiation.-In an action for assault and battery, the
defendant offered to prove, in mitigation of damages, a series of pro-
vocations, repeated and continued from day to day; and that every
time the parties met, the plaintiff insulted the defendant with most
opprobrious language, and to such an extent as to render him wild,
excited, frantic and partially insane. Also that the plaintiff had com-
mitted a most grievous injury, affecting the domestic relations of the
defendant; which was one of the insults with which the latter was
taunted. This evidence being objected to, the judge ruled that he
would allow the defendant to show anything which took place on the
day of the assault, or the day before, but not what took place several
days before; as, in that. case, the defendant had time for his passions to
cool. .THeN that the ruling was erroneous; and a new trial was granted:
Dolan v. Fagan, 63 Barb.
In such a case the jury ought to be permitted to hear the nature and
extent of the provocation; to hear and know how much of the beatina
complained of was, if not deserved, at least caused by the provocation
given : Id.
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 14 of his reports.
2 From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 10 Kansas Rep.
8 From Hon. 0. L. BRarbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 63 of his reportb.
' From Bon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 30 or 31 Wis. Rep.
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Each case should be controlled by its own peculiar circumstances
The question should be, not how many hours have elapsed since the
provocation was given, but whether, in view of the circumstances of the
case, the party has had a reasonable time to cool his blood : Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Suit by Assignee- Unlawfid Preference.-Suit in chancery by an
assignee in bankruptcy to recover the proceeds of goods sold under judg-
ment in a state court against the bankrupt taken by confession when
both parties knew of the insolvency. Such a judgment, though taken
before the 1st day of June 1867, is an unlawful preference under the
35th section of that aut, if taken after the enactment of the Bankrupt
Law : Traders' Bank v. Campbell, 14 Wall.
The proceeds of the sale of the bankrupt's goods being in the hands
of one sued as a defendant, another person who had a like judgment and
execution levied on the same goods is not a necessary party to this suit,
being without the jurisdiction. The rule laid down as to necessary
parties in chancery: Id.
The proceeds of the sale being in the hands of the bank, though it
had given the sheriff a certificate of deposit, the assignee was not obliged
to move against the sheriff in the state court to pay over the money to
him, but had his option to sue the bank which had directed the levy and
sale and held the proceeds in its vaults: d.
The defendant having money received as collections for the bankrupt
delivered it to the sheriff, who levied the defendant's execution on it and
applied it in satisfaction of the same. This is a fraudulent preference,
or taking by process under the act, and does not raise the question
whether if the defendant had retained the money it could be set off in
this suit against the bankrupt's debt to the defendant: Id.
So taking a check from the bankrupt and crediting the amount of the
check then on deposit, on the bankrupt's note the day before taking
judgment, was a payment by way of preference and therefore void, and
does not raise the question of set-off: Id.
Preference-Partnersip.-TUnder the statutes of Ohio authorizing
chattel mortgages, a seal is not necessary to their validity : Gibson v.
Warden, 14 Wall.
Where one partner, R. M., affixed his name and seal to an instrument
whose testatum set forth that R. M. & Sons, by R. M., one of the firm, had
thereto set their hands and seals," the instrument may be regarded as the
deed of all the partners on proof that prior to the execution the others
had authorized R. M. to execute the instrument, and after execution;
with full knowledge acquiesced in what he had done: Id.
The two clauses of the 35th section of the Bankrupt Act, differ mainly
in their application to two different classes of recipients of the bankrupt's
property or means, that is to say, the first clause is limited to a creditor,
a person having a claim against the bankrupt, or who is under any lia-
bility for him, and who receives money or property by way of preference;
and the second clause applies to the purchase of property of the bank-
rupt by any person who has no claim against him, and is under na
liability for him: Id.
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B3OND.
Delivery in Escrow-Fraudulent Possession by Obligee.-A bond for
a deed deposited with a disinterested third party, to be by him held
until a certain sum of money is paid and then delivered to the obligee,
is an escrow, and until the condition is performed it is a mere scroll and
no right of action accrues or can accrue thereon to the obligee: Robertm
v. MAilenix, 10 Kans.
Where possession of a bond so deposited is fraudulently obtained by
the obligee and assigned, it passes no right to the assignee as against the
obligor: Id. CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Will-Probate in State in which Testator not Domiciled.-A probate
in Louisiana of the will of a person who died domiciled in New York is
valid until set aside in the Louisiana court, though the order of the sur-
rogate in New York has been reversed in the Supreme Court of that
state, on which the Louisiana probate was founded: Foulke v. Zmmer-
man, 14 Wall.
A purchaser from the devisee of such will of real estate in Louisiana,
while the order of the Louisiana court establishing the will remains in
force, is an innocent purchaser, and is not affected by a subsequent order
setting aside the will, to which he is not a party: Jd.
Such an order, founded on a verdict and judgment in New York
declaring the will void, obtained by collusion between the devisee under
the will and the heirs at law, cannot affect the purchaser from the devisee,
made in good faith before such verdict and judgment: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Judgment.
Supreme Court of United States-Appeal .from Decision of State
Coart.-Where a decision of the highest court of a state in a case is
made on its settled pre-existent rules of general jurisprudence, the case
cannot be brought here under the 25th section ; notwithstanding the
fact that the state has subsequently made those rules one of the articles
of its Constitution. and the case be one where if the decision had been
made on the Constitution alone, a writ of error under the said section
might have lain : Bank of Vest Tenncssee v. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana,
14 Wall.
Sale of Slaves-Recoveiy of Price.-The Supreme Court of Louis-
iana ordered judgment for a plaintiff suing on a note given for the price
of slaves. Subsequently to this the state of Louisiana ordained as part
of its Constitution, " th at all contracts for the sale or purchase of slaves
were null and void, and that no court of the state should take cognisance
of any suit founded upon such contracts, and that no amount should
ever be collected or recovered on any judgment or decree which had
oeen, or should thereafter be, rendered on account of any such contract or
obligation." On application by the defendant in the suit to supersede
and perpetually stay all proceedings on the judgment against him, the
Supreme Court overruled the application. The case being brought here
under an assumption that it was within the 25th section, held that it
was not so; and the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction accord-
ingly : Sevier v. Haskell, 14 Wall.
Writ of Error to State Courts.-The court reasserts the principle that,
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in eases brought here by writs of error to the state courts, it will not
entertain jurisdiction if it appears that, besides the Federal question
decided by the state court, there is another and distinct ground on which
'he judgment or decree can be sustained, and which is sufficient to sup-
port it: Kennebec Railroad v. Portland Railroad, 14 Wall.
CONTRACT.
Rescission for Fraud or Nisreresentation-Laches.-Even where
there is no long and unexplained delay in bringing suit for the purpose,
a contract will not be rescinded on the ground of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation in procuring it, except upon clear and satisfactory proof:
Murphy v. Dunning, 30 or 31 Wis
Where there has been such delay, and the contract has passed into
the hands of an innocent holder for value, and the fraud is set up and
rescission demanded only after suit bronght upon the contract, a finding
that such fraud is unproven will not be reversed except upon a very clear
and decided preponderance of evidence against it: Id.
COUNTY.
Fees of Ph y s ician attending Prisoners in Jail.-A county is not bound
to pay a physician for medical services rendered by him in attending on
prisoners confined in the county jail, unless such services were authorized
by the county board: Roberts v. The Board of County Commissioners,
10 Kans.
DEED. See Husband and Wife; Mortgage.
Recording Acts-Apply in favor of I'tles by Judicial Sales -The
provisions of the Recording Act (R. S. ch. 86, § 25) are applicable in
favor of titles made through judicial sales and conveyances : BEie v
Brown et al., 30 or 31 Wis.
Thus, where a mortgage is foreclosed as against all persons having
any title or interest of record, and the land sold, and the sheriff's deed
duly recorded, a prior unrecorded deed from the last grantee of record
to one not made a party to the foreclosure, is void as against the grantee
in such sheriff's deed : Id.
Recording Acts-In whose Favor they apply.-The protection of the
Recording Act (R. S. ch. 86, § 25) which declares an unrecorded deed
void as against a subsequent pu-rehaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration whose deed shall be first recorded, is not confined to a sub-
sequent purchaser immediatelyfrom the same grantor, but applies to one
who takes from him through mesne conveyances; and it protects him,-
if a purchaser in good faith, for value, in case the chain of title to
him is first on record, although the intermediate grantees were charge.
able with bad faith, or paid nothing: Fallass, Adn'r., v. Pierce and
others, 30 or 31 Wis.
P. mortgaged land to B.,'and the mortgage was recorded. B. assigned
the mortgage to R., and the assignment was not recorded. B. then
released the land by deed to P. (who knew of the assignment to R.).
-and this release was recorded; and thereupon P. conveyed to X., a pur-
chaser in good faith, for value, who neglected to record his deed from
P. until after the assignment to R. and also an assignment fr= 1L. to
plaintiff's intestate, were recorded ; said intestate having taken such
assignment in good faith, for value. Held, that the deed to X., if re-
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cor(ded before the assignment of the mortgage, would have prevailed
against the mortgage, under the Recording Act; but in the abtience of
such prior record it does not cut, off the mortgage : 1.
X. having acquired the fee, subject to said mortgage, and being pre.
su'nptively in possession and liable for taxes subsequently levied, could
not take title by tax deed fbr such taxes unpaid : 1t.
Two powers of attorney to sell and convey lands situate in this state,
were executed in 1852, and were acknowledged respectively beiltre a
justice of the peace and a county clerk in Illinois, and were recorded in
the proper register's office in this state in 1855 and 1S39 respectively;
but were without the certificates autlenticating the signatures and ofli-
cial character, &e., of said justice and clerk, required by § 10, cli. 59,
R. S., 1849. flehl, that under § 105, eli. 137, It. S., and § 1, cl. 272,
Laws of 1864 (2 Tay. Sts. 1619, § 159), the record of a deed executed
in pursuance of such warrants o" attorney and otherwise duly recorded,
must be held in all legal proceedings pr1 ./me? ci  a valid record, binding
purchasers like any other recorded deed : Id.
An instrunct in writing, under land and seal, but without a sub.
scribing witnc-s or acknowledgment, as required by the Revised Statutes,
is insutlicient to convey real estate, and void as against a pureha.-er or
eucumbrancer: Roggen v. fvery, 63 Barb.
EVIDENC:. See itortgage.
HIGHWAY.
Libilly of Town forlii fficeacg of-The " insufficiency or.want of
relmir,'" in a highway which renders a town liable for injuries resulting
therefrom (1 S., eh. 19, § 120), exists wherever the road is not a rea-
soiably .m/fi' aid convenient one, in view of the amount and character of'
the travel thereon,. the nature of the country through which it runs,
& le. : |/,eb,' v. The 1Ibw'u of tcstport, 30 or 31 Wis.
The quetion whether the highway, at the time and place or the
injury comldt,,ned of, was insufficient or out of' repair, is one f t'et for
the jury. tunieir proper instructions: 1,L.
At a certalo point in a highway whose general width was les' than
fifty tct. a (iP of' land nearly or quite rectangular projected inti the
,-,'tw ,d line .f the highwaiy on one side to a depth or from ,,ril vo,n to
twuty [fet; and there was a line of lIouldrs front one to two feet hi 7h
aohm the tlirce sid of the strip adjoi nitig the road. The tr.ixloled
tra,.k ran clxi to theCe boulders on all three Sides of m-aid strip. its
dirt 'tiou leiig twice elang.d abruptly to eotto,'t thereto. At a dis-
tatee of i, i;,,tt fton saidl row of' honlhrs, on the other sid (if the
trav''llel traik, the road was itade itlia.-al to by deep ptll i,'. The,
hi.u'hwav was eitsid,m'ralty travelled, was oer inl open pr;tirie, and m iglit
ca-ily have been made passable iin its whole breadth of' thirty Iveet alotig
said prijectitg striIt; and the strip itself I'iglt hlave been coltilet.titi.
and the road opened over it : JIIhl, That upon these iets the jury might
well find the rmad insufficient : M.
h'littiff's aolleral aeq tt tittance with the obst'uetion causing the
injur,'y will not necs.mnr'I p'revett his recovery, if. udcr the eireuni-
stattees, he Iitight still, in tle exerise of' ordinary prudence, have been
unaware of his proximity to it: d.
P'laintiff was knowingly walking oil the grass outside of the travelled
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track, within a foot or eighteen inches thereof, and had been so walking
for some distance before encountering the sharp angle of the line of
boulders aforesaid, over which he stumbled and was injured. He lived
on the road, about half a mile distant, and was familiar with it and with
the situation of the boulders. It was a rather dark night; the boulders
were not visible; the travelled track was wet and sticky. He was a
physician, and had been called out to visit a sick person, and was walk-
ing close by the side of and conversing with the messenger who came
for him, who was walking on the track leading a horse; and he testified
that lie was not thinking of these stones when he came upon them:
Held, that upon these facts the court did not err (as against the town)
in submitting to the jury the question of contributory negligence: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Acknowledgment of Instruments by Married Woman.-The Act of
the Legislature of April 11th 1849 (Laws, cl. 375, § 3) which provides
that any married woman may convey real estate "in the same manner,
and with the like effect, as if she were unmarried," repeals, as to mar-
ried women and their separate estates, the provisions of the Rievised
Statutes requiring a private examination, apart from their husbands,
upon their acknowledgment of the execution of conveyances: Richard-
son, v. Pulver, 63 Barb.
A married woman, therefore, having a power of appointment over
land', of which the legal title is vested in a trustee, may execute an
instrument, desiring the trustee to execute a conveyance of the premises
to her, in pursuance of a power contained in the trust deed; and may
legally acknowledge the execution of such instrument in the usual form,
without any private examination: ITd.
The validity of the execution of such a request to the trustee is to be
tested by the form of acknowledgment at that time requisite, for mar-
ried women : Id.
The claim that the acknowledgment of such an insirument should be
in accordance with the Revised Statutes, is at most based upon an
inchoate right, and the repealing statute is valid against it: Id.
Purclhase of Property by Wife from Husband.-A married woman
may purchase personal property with her own money from her husband,
and if a subsequent creditor of her husband should cause such property
to be seized in execution to pay her husband's debts, she may replevy
the same from the officer: Faddis v. Woolomes, 10 Kans.
INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS.
Removal of Spirits.-Parties have a right to enter into a stipulation
waiving a jury in the District Court, and to submit their case to the
court upon an agreed statement of facts, independent of any legislative
provision on the subject: Hendersoi's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall.
Where a forfeiture is made absolute by statute a decree of condemnation
relates back to the time of the commission of the wrongful acts, and takes
effect from that time, and not from the date of the decree. Accord-
ingly where a removal of distilled spirits from the place where distilled,
with intent to defraud the United States of the tax thereon, was alleged
as a ground for the forfeiture of the spirits, it was held that neither the
subbequent payment of the taxes nor the fact that the claimant was an
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innocent purchaser, without notice of the wrongful acts of the antece
dent owner, constituted a defence to the charge : Id.
A removal of distilled spirits from the place where distilled to a bonde
warehouse of the United States, if made to secure the payment of tht
tax to the government. is a lawful act. but if made with intent to defrau
the United States of the tax. the act of removal is illegal, and the spirit,
removed are subject to forfeiture. A removal of the spirits from tht
place where distilled to the bonded warehouse is not inconsistent with
and may be a part of a scheme to defraud the United States of the
duties: .d.
JUDG3IENT.
Record of Court of another State.-A record of a judgment rendered
in Connecticut, properly authenticated under the Act of Congress of
May 26th 1790 (1 U. S. Stat. at Large 122), by having the proper cer-
tificates and signatures of the clerk and judge and the seal of the court
appended thereto, will be presumed primificie to be valid and binding,
and entitled to full faith and credit in Connecticut and elsewhere,
although the judgment may not be signed by the judge of the court
rendering it; and in general, whenever a judicial record which would
be valid and binding, if made in this state, comes properly authenticated
from another state, it will be presumed to be valid and binding in the
state from which it comes until the contrary is shown; and until the
2ontrary is shown, full ihith and credit will be given to it here: Prench
v. Pease et aL, 10 Kans.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES.
Value at Different Times-Damages assessed in.-A cargo was ship-
ped from Canada to New York, October 7th 1864, when gold was 101
per cent. above legal tender notes of the United States. The cargo was
wrecked soon after, on the Hudson. Oi libel in the admiralty at New
York. and on appeal from the District Court, the Circuit Court, on the
26th March 1870, when gold was only 12 per cent. above notes, gave
the libellants a decree for the value in gold of the cargo on the day and
at the place of shipment, converting that value, at the same time. into
legal tender notes, at the rate at which such notes stood as compared
with gold on the day of shipment ; that is to say, when gold was 101 per
cent. above legal tender notes, or, in other words, when it required 8201
legal tender notes to buy $100 of gold. On appeal to this court t.the
difference between gold and notes having now sunk to about 9 per cent ),
aeld that this decree was right: The Traughan and Telegraph, 14 Wall.
MANDAMUS.
To compel Peformae of Public Dtty.-Mandamus will not lie at
the instance of a private citizen to compel the performance of a purely
public duty : Bobbett et al. v. The State, 10 Kans.
Such a suit must be brought in the name of the state, and the county
attorney and the attorney-general are the officers authorized to use the
name of the state in legal proceedings and to enforce the performance
of public duties: Id.
Where a private citizen sues out a man(atnuts he must show an inte-
rest soecific and peculiar in himself, and not one that he shares with the
3ominunity in general: Id.
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interest of Petitione for.-An allegation that plaintiffs are qualified
7oters and freeholders of a township, discloses no such peculiar and
specific interest as will sustain a mandamus to compel the county board
to order, in such township, an election on the question of issuing bonds:
Turner et al. v. TT e Board of County Commissioners, 10 Kans.
MoRxGAGE. See Bal 7mptcy; Deed.
Of Chattes-Fiing in proper Place-Evidence.--When a chattel
mortgage is not filed in the proper town, it seems that a copy thereof
certified by the clerk of such town is not competent evidence to show
title in the mortgagee as against a creditor of the mortgagor: Evans v.
Sprague, 30 or 31 Wis.
But an objection to such evidence must be specific, showing the pre-
cise defect relied on, or its admission will not be error: Id.
M1UNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Negotiable Securities.-When a corporation has power under any cir-
cumstances to issue negotiable securities the bona fide holder has a right
to presume that they were issued under the circumstances which give
the requisite authority, and they are no more liable to be impeached for
any infirmity in the hands of such a holder than any other commercial
paper: Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall.
A municipal corporation on a suit against it for bonds issued to a
railroad, set up that the plaintiff had notice of certain proceedings,
which (as the plea alleged) destroyed the plaintiff's right to sue. The
plaintiff replied, denying the notice. The city demurred to the replica.
tion. Held, that the city thus admitted that he had no notice: Id.
A suit upon a coupon or interest warrant to a bond is not barred by
the Statute of Limitations, unless the lapse of time is sufficient to bar
also a suit upon the bond: RZd.
NATIONAL BANKS.
Suits against-Default in Payment of Notes.-A national banking
association may be sued in any state, county, or municipal court in the
county or city where such association is located, having jurisdiction in
similar cases: Bank of Bethel v. Pahguioque Bank, 14 Wall.
Such an association does not lose its corporate existence by mere
default in paying its circulating notes, and upon the mere appointment
of a receiver: Id.
Such an association may be sued though a receiver have been
appointed, and is administering its concerns: Id.
The decision of the receiver upon the validity of a claim presented to
him for a dividend is not final; the creditor may proceed afterward to
have the validity of the claim judicially adjudicated in a suit in a pro.
per state court, against the bank: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Highway.
NEGOTiABLE BOND. See Municipal Corporation.
Effect of Assignment-Transfer as Security.-Where the complaint
avers that defendant's note and mortgage to a railroad company were
sold, assigned and delivered to plaintiffs by such company, and the
answer merely alleges that said company never endorsed over said note
to any person by writing its name thereon for that purpose, and that said
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company has at all times refused to endorse the note, or to do any act
which would make it negotiable-this is not a denial of the assignment
by the company as alleged in the complaint, nor of the authority of the
officers by whom such assignment was made, but merely denies that
such assignment was in law an endorsement, and plaintiffs are not put
upon proof of the authority of said officers: MaJphy v. Dunning, 30
or 31 Wis.
Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 616, and Bange v. Flint, 25 Id. 544, fol-
lowed, as to the effect as an endorsement of the transfer of a note and
mortgage attached to a negotiable bond of a railroad company, which
recites that said note and mortgage are transferred as security fbr such
bond, and are transferable only in connection with it: .d.
PERJURY.
Matteriality of Testimony for the Cout.-On a trial for perjury, the
materiality of the alleged false testimony is generally a question of law
for the court: State of Kansas v. Johln Lewis, 10 Kans.
But. if left to the jury, and their verdict determines the question of
materiality, as the court should have instructed them, no error is done
to the substantial rights of the defendant: Id.
Where an information charges an offence at a certain time and place,
testimony that the defendant was at that time at a remote place, is
*prindfacie material: Id.
The failure to enter a plea to an information does not render a subse-
quent trial so far void that false swearing thereon cannot be perjury: Id.
SHIPPING.
Bill of Lading.-A "clean" bill of lading, that is to say a bill of
lading which is silent as to the place of stowage, imports a contract that
the goods are to be stowed under deck: 1'he Delaware, 14 Wall.
This being so, parol evidence of an agreement that they were to be
stowed on deck is inadmissible: Id.
SLAVES. See Constitutional Law.
STATUTES,
In loate Rights.-Inchoate rights, generally, derived under a statute,
are lost by its repeal; unless saved by express words in the repealing
statute: Richardson, v. .ulver, 63 Barb.
TAX TITLE.
Deed must show a Sale for Delinquent Taxs-Limnitations.-A tax-
deed which does not show that the land it purports to convey was sold
fr delinquent taxes is void upon its face; and where the holder of such
IL tax-deed has never been in the actual possession of the property which
;he deed purports to convey, the two years' Statute of Limitations will
not run so as to bar an action brought for the purpose of having the
deed declared void: Hubbard v. Johnson, 10 Kans.
TROVER.
Danzages.-In an action for trover and conversion, the defendant cannot
pr )ve,in mitigation of damages, that the plaiutiff has regained possession of
the property And it is erroneous to charge that it is a case for nominal
damages only. If the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the full value
of the property, he is at least entitled to recover the actual damages he
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has sustained by being deprived of the use of the property, and the
expense incurred in regaining possession: prague v. .AcKinzie, 63
Barb.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
Trust as to RealEstate.-In Kansas no express trust concerning real
estate can be created except by writing: Knaggs v. Hastin, 10 Kans.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Constitutional Law.
Jurisdiction- Citizenshp of Parties-Negotiable Paper.-The restric-
tion of the 11th section of the Judiciary Act giving original jurisdiction
to the Circuit Courts, but providing that they shall not "have cognisance
of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose
in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prose-
cuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had
been made," does not apply to cases transferred from state courts under
the Act of March 2d 1867, giving to either party in certain cases a
right to transfer a suit brought in a state court where either makes affi-
davit, &c., "that he has reason to believe, and does believe, that from
prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such
court :" City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall.
Independently of this, negotiable paper (within which class coupons to
municipal bonds, if having proper words of negotiability, fall) is not
regarded as falling within the exception: Id.
USURY.
Note drawing Interest until paid-Effect of Payment of additional
Sum for Extension of Time.-Where a note draws interest until paid, at
the highest legal rate, an agreement by the maker to pay any additional
sum for an extension is usurious: Meiswinkle v. McCallough et al., 30
or 31 Wis. "
While such agreement is executory as to both parties, it is void as to
both, and does not discharge a surety on the note: Id.
Even where the stipulated excess has been paid by the maker (the
amount being recoverable under our statute), it seems that the promise
to extend is void, as being without consideration, and that the surety is
not discharged: Id.
To whom the Lzws will apply-Agreement by Third Party to pay
Extra Interest.-Usury laws are designed to protect the borrower from
being obliged to pay more than the amount limited thereby for the loan
or forbearance for money; and not to prevent the lender from receiving"
such excess from third parties, who voluntarily undertake to pay it:
McArthur v. Schenck et al., 30 or 31 Wis.
A. proposes to buy of B. a farm for $2500 cash, if he can borrow the
money, and applies to C. therefor. C. offers, through B. as Lis agent,
to loan the amount to A. for thirty dollars in excess of the highest legal
interest; and upon A. refusing to borrow on those terms, B. agrees to
pay the thirty dollars, or to accept for the land $2470; and A. there
upon receives from C. and pays to B. the last-named sum, and gives his
note aud mortgage to C. for $2500, at the highest legal rate of interest:
Held, in an action by C. against A., that there is no contract on A.'s
part to pay usurious_ interest and f 1 I- -
Id.
